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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
JUDITH H. DIENES, and
DIANNE D. McMAIN,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
SAFECO LIFE INSURANCE
COMP ANY, a Washington
corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
11048

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appellants will be referred to as plaintiffs and
the Respondent will be referred to as the defendant.
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover $10,000.00 under
the double indemnity provisions of an accidental
death and dismemberment clause of a life insurance
policy.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury, which returned
a verdict in favor of the defendant and against the
plaintiffs, "No Cause of Action". Judgment was
entered on June 15, 1967 (R. 9 and R. 11).
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks affirmance of the judgment
entered on the verdict.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant issued an accidental death and
dismemberment policy on the life of Lewis S. DiEnes
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. See the last page of the exhibit for pertinent provisions). The plaintiff Judith
H. DiEnes, surviving wife, was married to Mr. DiEnes in 1961, and plaintiff Dianne D. McMain, is
a daughter by a former marriage ( R. 72). They
claim that Lewis S. DiEnes died as the result of an
accident under the provisions of the policy which
state:
"ACCIDENTAL DEATH AND DISMEMBERMENT BENEFITS. - Subject to
the exclusion provision, if any employee, while
insured by this policy and prior to retirement,
sustains bodily injuries effected solely
through e x t e r n a 1, violent and accidental
means, and as a result thereof, suffers within
90 days one of the following losses, Lifeco Insurance Company of America will pay the appicable amount specified in the Schedule of
Insurance for Accidental Death and Dismemberment Insurance, or one-half such amount,
as indicated:
1. For loss of life, the full amount";

*

*

*

"EXCLUSIONS - No Benefits under
this Accidental Death and Dismemberment
provision shall be paid for accidental death
or dismemberment caused by:
2

1. Disease or bodily or mental infirmity
or i:iedical or sur~ica.l trea~ment thereof, pto:
n:ame or b~ctenal mfect10n (except infections occurrmg through an accidental cut or
wound); ...

* * *

Because of the extensive medical history of the
insured, the defendant deems it necessary to set
forth some of that background as established at the
trial.
The deceased, Lewis DiEnes, sustained minor
injuries when he drove his automobile into the rear
end of a parked taxicab on August 5, 1965 (R. 6).
He suffered a 1.5 cm. laceration of the nose, abrasions to the face and knees, and was hit in the stomach fairly hard (Ex. 3-D, & Record of Surgical Procedure 8-5-67). He was taken to the hospital and
was given an examination by Dr. Donald E. Smith.
An electrocardiogram was taken as well as a routine
blood count, and he was otherwise prepared for a
minor surgical procedure whereby his nose was sutured. He tolerated the procedure well (Ex. 3-D)
and Mrs. DiEnes stated that his condition was good.
He ate a good dinner and she left for her home about
9 :30 p.m. Mr. DiEnes wanted to go with her (R.
74), but the Doctor insisted that he stay at the hospital (R. 72, 74, 84).
Dr. Smith first treated Mr. DiEnes February
4, 1964, at which time he gave him a thorough physical examination (R. 76). He noted a past history of
heart disease. Mr. DiEnes suffered a myocardial in3

fraction in March 1962 ( R. 74) . He was suffering
from angina pectoris and was under medication for
this disease (R. 77). The resulting pain is from an
insufficient supply of blood and oxygen to the heart
muscles (R. 77). He also had hypertension or high
blood pressure, arteriosclerotic heart disease and a
past history of kidney stones ( R. 77). Dr. Smith
also saw him in September 1964 for what he then
considered was a "disturbing new development"; a
severe attack of bronchial asthma (R. 78). At the
time he didn't think the asthma was related to the
heart problem. Esterliazine, a relaxant to control insomnia resulting from apprehension was prescribed
(R. 78). The doctor continued to see Mr. DiEnes at
two week intervals. The next significant change occurred January 29, 1965, when Mr. DiEnes started
showing early signs of "congestive heart failure"
( R. 79). The Doctor explained that this disease develops when the heart cannot keep up the pumping
load required and as a result becomes enlarged and
congestion begins to develop in other tissues of the
body and into the lungs. He then determined that
the breathing problem was a secondary symptom of
the congestive heart failure ( R. 80). Mr. DiEnes
began to show signs of puffiness of the ankles, marked shortness of breath and x-ray studies showed an
enlarged ·heart, which condition is tied to congestive
heart failure disease (R. 80, 92). Mr. DiEnes was
given digitalis for treatment of early congestive
heart failure ( R. 80). At about this time Mr. Di4

Enes experienced a "distressing circumstance" when
it became necessary for him to go to Chicago to arrange for the funeral of his sister. The doctor indicated that he was "very definitely worse following
that episode ... " (R. 81).
Mr. DiEnes was on medication for high blood
pressure, hyperdill to improve his circulation, digitalis to strengthen and improve the heart's efficiency when in a state of failure, diuretics to assist the
kidneys to eliminate excess fluid and relieve congestion of tissues, all of which problems were secondary to the congestive heart failure (R. 82). Mr.
DiEnnes was a very tense person and was never
calm (R. 83, 93).
Dr. Smith saw Mr. DiEnes between 6:00 and
8:00 o'clock in the evening of the day of the accident
and although he wanted to go home the Doctor insisted that he stay at the hospital (R. 84). Two
months prior to the date of the accident Mr. DiEnes
had a myocardial infraction, a physical malfunction
in which a clot blocks a vein that supplies the heart
and the heart muscle dies. Dr. Smith had then contemplated surgical intervention (R. 85, 91). On
cross-examination Dr. Smith testified that it was
unlikely that the injuries resulting from the minor
automobile accident would have caused death, independent of the previous heart con di tion ( R. 88).
The accident did not cause any change in the electrocardiogram from the one taken two months earlier
( R. 82) . At 1 : 00 A. M. on the morning following the
5

accident, Mr. DiEnes was awakened at the hospital
by a nurse for the purpose of taking his temperatme,
respiration and pulse, which was done and all were
found to be normal. Ten minutes later he was found
dead (R. 91). Dr. Smith prepared the death certif.
icate, which was admitted in evidence as Exhibit
2-P. The Doctor stated that it was his belief that the
"automobile accident was a direct, contributing factor to his final heart attack ( R. 86).
Dr. Smith admitted that Mr. DiEnes' medical
history was one of continual worsening condition
( R. 93) . He also agreed with Dr. Carlquist' s diagnosis following the autopsy, which states in part as
follows:
"MAJOR DIAGNOSIS:
Marked coronary sclerosis with moder·
ately recent thrombosis; myocardial ne·
crosis, old and recent, with mural throm·
bus formation at left apex; congestion of
viscera; renal calculi, left, laceration of
nose and abrasion of face and knees.
"COMMENT:
This man showed an extreme degree of
coronary sclerosis with tremendous narrowing of the lumen of the vessels due to
both sclerosis and thrombosis. As a re·
sult, there was marked destruction of the
myocardium in all blocks studied. The
more acute necrosis was at the apex of
the left ventricle and a mural thrombus
had formed in this area. He had been in
some degree of congestive failure as
shown by the sections of the lung, liver
6

and spleen. He also showed the effects of
his recent accident with laceration of the
nose and abrasions of face and knees."
(Ex. 3-D p. 25).
The "moderately recent thrombosis", referred
to probably resulted from the heart attack in June
of 1965 (R. 95). The "congestion of viscera", refers to congestion of the intestines, which is a result
of "ensuing congestive heart failure" ( R. 95) . The
notation that "He had been in some degree of congestive failure, as shown by sections of lung, liver
and spleen", indicated he had been in this degree of
congestive failure prior to the accident (R. 96). The
doctor admitted that Mr. DiEnes' condition had
worsened to a point where "any episode of serious
anxiety could have caused him to expire," and that
he experienced periods of anxiety at night because
he couldn't sleep and had difficulty in breathing
(R. 97, 98).
Dr. Carlquist, a pathologist and director of laboratories at L.D.S. Hospital, testified that he had
performed an autopsy on Lewis DiEnes, August 6,
1965 (R. 102). As noted above, the major findings
were those related to the heart (R. 104). His autopsy report is contained as a part of the hospital records, Exhibit D-3, beginning at page 25 (R. 105).
His findings revealed an occlusion of both coronary
arteries, which supply blood to the heart muscles
(R. 105). The lumen, or the openings in the blood
vessels, were almost completely closed by the sclerosis process and only a "tiny opening that would rep7

resent approximately 5% of the former total open.
ing" was available for passage of blood. In addition,
portions of the lumen were filled with degenerating
blood, representing the thrombus of some of the vessels ( R. 105). The doctor then drew a diagram in
connection with Exhibit 4-D, in which he graphically portrayed the available opening in the blood vessels in relation to the normal opening ( R. 106-107).
He found old clotting in some areas so that there
was no passage possible through parts of these vessels. This condition usually develops over a period of
years ( R. 107. He also found a "sclerotic con di ti on
in the right coronary arteries" although not as involved as the left ( R. 107). There was also damage
to the heart muscle (R. 107-108). The left ventricle
wall of the heart had also thinned from a normal
thickness of about 1.6 centimeters to 1.2 centimeters
in thickness; "a rather thin wall" (R. 108). The
degeneration process of the deceased heart had pro·
gressed to a point that on the left ventricle wall of
the heart blood clots or "thrombii" had formed and
were adhered to the wall ( R. 108, 109) . These clots
had formed prior to death and the kidneys also showed a condition of nephroscelrotic secondary to heart
disease ( R. 109). The liver showed evidence of
chronic passive congestion secondary to heart failure
( R. 110). The spleen and lungs also revealed that
Mr. DiEnes was suffering from congestive heart
failure (R. 109).
In the opinion of the pathologist, DiEnes died
8

"as a result of severe cardiac damage; his severe
heart disease," which condition predated the accident (R. 110, 115). He didn't attempt to assess the
relationship between the accident and the heart condition (R. 115).
Dr. George Curtis, a specialist in internal medicine and cardiology also testified. No reference at
all is contained in Plaintiff's Brief under statement
of "MATERIAL FACTS", to his testimony. He explained that the heart attack Mr. DiEnes suffered
in 1965 involved a different artery of the heart than
the first one in 1962 ( R. 20). This can be clinically
determined because when a heart muscle dies it releases an enzyeme into the blood which can be measured. He confirmed the finding of Dr. Smith that
the electrocardiogram which was taken on the day
of the accident, August 4, 1965, showed no change
from the one which was taken in June of the same
year, although it did show changes as a result of the
1962 and 1965 heart attacks (R. 121). The results
of the electrocardiogram did not have any significance insofar as injuries sustained in the accident
were concerned ( R. 122). He expressed his opinion
that the accident had no connection with the death
of Mr. DiEnes (R. 123).
The autopsy report in Dr. Curtis' opinion, showed the following essential findings=
"One, a markedly enlarged heart that
was really twice as large as normal.
"Second, it showed sever~ arteriosclerosis, with a complete obstruction of the ar9

teries in two of the main arteries and inter.
mittent obstruction.

"The third, artery there, it showed evidence of old heart attacks, with marked destruction of the muscle and a destruction of
the septum between the two sides of the heart
and it showed recent thrombus clots in othe{
part~ of the a~·teries o~ his heart, showing extensive arter10sclerotic heart disease with
very little blood getting through any of these
major arteries." ( R. 124).
On cross-examination, he testified that anxiety
can be a precipitating cause of a further heart problem, but he didn't believe that the anxiety factor was
a contributing factor to the death of Mr. DiEnes (R.
125). In his opinion, Mr. DiEnes had already lived
longer than one would expect ( R. 125).
Following presentation of the plaintiffs' case,
the defendant made a Motion to Dismiss plaintiffs'
Complaint, upon the grounds that the evidence, as a
matter of law, showed that the claim for the additional accidental death benefit was not due under
the policy, because the prior heart disease was a
contributing factor to Mr. DiEnes' death (R. 98).
The defendant's Motion was based upon a reading
of the "Accidental Death and Dismemberment Benefits" provision to the effect that before the benefits
would become due, death had to result ''from bodily
injuries effected solely through external, violent and
accidental means ... " The Court then indicated that
he was inclined to reject this argument, which he
later did, and stated:
10

"THE COURT:
. "My pres~nt feeling is that I would have
to mstruct - if I permitted that to go to the
jury -. in this fashion: 'In order to prove the
essential elements, plaintiffs claim the burden is on them to establish by a preponderance o~ ~he evidence in the case the following
propos1t10n: That the death of Lewis DiEnes
resulted from bodily injuries effected solely
through external, vi o 1 en t, and accidental
means'."
"MR. MANGUM:
'If your Honor gives that instruction, I
don't think I would take an exception, if you
gave it in that precise form you just gave it."
1

'

(R. 100).

Further colloquy and argument occurred between the Court and counsel, but in essence the
Court denied the defendant's Motion when it was
renewed following the close of the evidence ( R.
126). Plaintiffs' counsel conceded that the heart disease was at least "a contributing factor" in DiEnes'
death ( R. 127). The court properly analyzed the
situation by stating that if he ruled in favor of the
defendant's contention, he would direct the jury to
return a verdict in favor of the defendant. However,
he denied the defendant's Motion and ruled that it
was a matter for the jury to determine by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the death came
within the provisions of the policy and hence submitted the same to the jury for consideration (R.
128).
11

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE MANNER
IN WHICH IT SUBMITTED TO THE JURY
THE ISSUE OF COVERAGE UNDER THE INSURANCE POLICY, AND THERE WAS SUFFICIENT E V I D E N C E TO SUPPORT THE
JURY'S FINDING THAT DECEDENT'S
D E AT H RESULTED FROM NA TUR AL
CAUSES UNRELATED TO INJURIES SUSTAINED IN THE ACCIDENT.

The plaintiffs contend that the language of the
policy does not require them to prove that his death
resulted solely from the injuries incurred by external, violent and accidental means (Plaintiffs'
Brief p. 12). As noted, the defendant's counsel
made a motion at the conclusion of the plaintiffs'
case for an involuntary nonsuit on the grounds that
as a matter of law there was no coverage because
the testimony conclusively showed that the prior
heart disease was a contributing cause of the death,
and therefore, the death did not result solely from
the automobile injuries ( R. 98, 99, 127). Mr. Mangum agreed with this interpretation of the evidence
(R. 127). The trial court rejected the defendant's
contention and denied the Motion for Nonsuit. The
Court aptly summed up the two positions of the
parties in this language :
"THE COURT:
"Plaintiff, in effect, contends that the
contract means that, if death resulted because
12

of accident and illness, plaintiff is entitled to
recover."

*

*

*

"Defendant contends, in essence, that if
death resulted because of a combination of
accident and illness, plaintiff is not entitled
to recover." ( R. 134, 135).
The Court in further considerating the motion
stated:
"THE COURT:
"If I rule on the interpretation of the
policy in favor of Mr. Hanson's (defendant's)
contention then, I will direct the jury.
"MR. MANGUM:
"I realize that; I hope you don't, but I
realize that is the provision."
"THE COURT:
''If I rule on your contention as to the
interpretation of the policy, it seems to me
that I must submit the matter to the jury,
then, to determine the preponderance of the
evidence."
"MR. MANGUM:
"I agree with that." (R. 128).
Thereafter the court submitted the matter to
the jury and therefore accepted the plaintiffs' theory
that it was a jury question as to whether or not
death resulted within the coverage of the policy.
The Court submitted this question to the jury
in the language of the policy, in its Instruction No.
15, which is as follows:
13

"INSTRUCTION NO. 15
"In order to prove the essential elements
of plaintiffs' claim, the burden is on them to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence
in the case the following proposition: That
the death of Lewis DiEnes was a result of
bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means."
Plaintiffs' counsel had previously impliedly indicated to the Court that this instruction, if given in
the form indicated, would be acceptable (R. 100).
Although the defendant does not agree that the trial
court was correct in denying its Motion for an Involuntary Nonsuit and for a Directed Verdict at the
conclusion of the evidence, doubt was resolved in
favor of the plaintiff on the question of cause of
death by submitting the matter to the jury.
A considerable portion of the plaintiffs' Brief
contains a discussion of cases dealing with the legal
effect of language in certain insurance policies considered by this and other courts. The major thrust
is to the effect that the present policy as written,
would permit a finding that the plaintiffs could
recover if Mr. DiEnes' death occurred as a result
of injuries effected ·". . . solely through external,
violent and accidental means . . . " It is conceded
that the evidence "conclusively shows that the diseased heart of Mr. DiEnes was a concurring cause
of his death", but they "deny the obligation to prove
that his death was the 'sole result' " of the injuries
received in the minor automobile accident. They ac14

knowledge that if this contention is wrong the appeal should be dismissed. The plaintiffs were not
given the burden of proving that the accident was
the "sole cause". The trial court submitted this question to the jury in the precise language of the policy.
In so doing, the court, in effect, accepted plaintiffs'
argument concerning the interpretation of the policy.
The plaintiff cites the case of Standard Life
ln.'3. Co. vs. Foster, 210 Miss. 242, 49 S.2d 391
(1950), as authority for the proposition that it is
a jury question as to whether or not death of the insured was the "proximate result of bodily injuries
which were effected solely by external, violent and
accidental means". In that case the court held there
was sufficient evidence to sustain a judgment on a
verdict for the plaintiff on conflicting evidence. We
submit that this issue was in fact submitted to the
jury in this case, and a determination adverse to the
plaintiffs was made.
The evidence in the case was sufficient to have
justified the court in granting defendant's Motion
for Involuntary Nonsuit following presentation of
plaintiffs' case, or a Directed Verdict in its favor
following the close of evidence. Browning vs. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 94 Utah 532, 72 P.2d
1060, 1073-74 (1937), was an action on a policy insuring against loss resulting "directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental
means." The court affirmed the decision in favor of
15

the plaintiff, holding that there was no evidenc that
there was an existing disease within the meaning of
the law at the time of the accident which produced
the plaintiff's disability and that the toxemia which
probably existed in the insured's system at the time
of the accident, later causing arthritis in the injured
finger, was a mere condition and not a moving cause
of the injury. The Court in its opinion analyzes the
decisions construing similar policy provisions as
follows:
"An injury effected through violent, external, and accidental means, entirely independent of all other causes, have made three
distinctions or classes of cases: ( 1) When an
accident causes a diseased condition which,
together with the accident, results in the injury or death complained of, the accident
alone is to be considered as the cause of the
injury or death. French vs. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 135 Wis. 259, 115 N.W. 869, 17
L.R.A. (N.S.) 1011, Cary vs. Preferred Acc.
Ins. Co. of New York, 127 Wis. 67, 106 N.W.
1055, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 926, 115 Am. St. Rep.
997, 7 Ann. Cas. 484. (2) When, at the time
of the accident, the insured was suffering
from some disease, but the disease had no
causal connection with the injury or death resulting from the accident, the accident is to
be considered the sole cause. Bohdker vs.
Travelers' Ins. Co., 215 Mass. 32, 102 N.E.
342, 344, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 543. (3) W~en. at
the time of the accident there was an existing
disease which, cooperating with the acci~ent,
resulted in the injury or death, the accident
cannot be considered as the sole cause, or as
16

the. cause independent of all other causes.
Smith vs. Federal Life Ins. Co., (D.C.) 6 F.2d
283; Cretney vs. Wodmen Acc. Co., 196 Wis.
29, 219 N.W. 448, 62 A.L.R. 675; Leland vs.
Order of United Commercial Travelers of
America, 233 Mass. 558, 124 N.E. 517, 520."
The trial court held that the plaintiff's claim
fell within the first class which was affirmed by
the majority of the Court. If the claim had fallen
within the third class, there would have been no
coverage. The additional excerpt from the opinion is
pertinent:
"On such a record, can the case fall within class ( 3) so as to bar a recovery? This class
requires that there be an existing disease, one
existing at the time of the accident, which cooperates with the accident to produce the disability. Cretney vs. Woodmen Acc. Co. 196
Wis. 29, 219 N.W. 448, 62 A.L.R. 675. We
have searched the record in vain for any evidence that there was an existing disease within the meaning of the law, at the time of the
accident, which produced the disability. Two
propositions of law are thus presented which
we shall discuss from the authorities. First,
that an existing disease, to take a case out of
the insured provisions of the policy, does not
mean a temporary disorder or derangement
of the bodily organs, system, or functions,
nor does it mean a tendency or susceptibility
to a disease, but means a chronic or d~finite
affliction such as would be embraced m the
common understanding and meaning of the
term 'diseased' or 'sick'; and second, that the
term 'independently of all other causes' does
not mean uninfluenced or unaffected by any
17

other cause, but i;ieans uncontrolled by any
other cause, that is, that there was no independent intervening cause unproduced or unmfluenced by the injury, which, acting of itself and without stimulation by the injury,
tends to produce the result."
It seems clear that the present facts fall within
class (3) enumerated by the court; that is that there
was an existing disease which was the concurring
sole cause of the death, and there is no coverage. See
also annotation, Pre-existing physical condition as
affecting liability under accident policy or accident
f ea tu re of Zif e policy, 84 A.L.R. 2d 176.
Were the Court to go further than it did in
instructing the jury, it would have in fact been presenting the arguments of counsel under guise of the
court's Instructions. This, of course, would have resulted in prejudicial error. The plaintiffs' cause is
not aided by citing to the court the law that insurance policies must be construed in favor of the insured, as stated in Browning vs. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., Supra, because the court in construing
the language of the present policy did resolve doubt
in favor of coverage and submitted the question of
cause of death to the jury. However, it would have
been error for the court to submit the matter to the
jury on the plaintiffs' theory, as was done, and then
in effect, further advise the jury that they were instructed to resolve doubts in favor of the plaintiffs
by presenting plaintiffs' argument under the sanctity of a court's "instruction".
18

Plaintiffs in their statement of ~'MATERIAL
FACTS" avoid any reference to the testimony of
Dr. George Curtis, which was favorable to defendant, even though the plaintiffs, as appellants were
under the responsibility of reciting the facts in "the
light most favorable to the party who prevailed below." Ortega vs. Thomas, 14 U.2d 296, 297, 383
P.2d 406 (1963).
Dr. Smith testified that the minor accident in
which DiEnes was involved was a contributing factor in bringing about his death. Dr. Carlquist did
not attempt to assess the relationship of the accident
to the cause of death. Dr. Curtis testified that the
accident was in no way responsible for his death,
and that he had such advanced heart disease that
he had already lived beyond what one would normally expect a person with his symptoms to live.
The evidence was undisputed that Dr. Smith,
decedent's private physician, gave Mr. DiEnes a
thorough examination, including an electrocardiogram and assured himself that Mr. DiEnes could
undergo minor surgery without ill effects for the
purpose of suturing his nose laceration. The electrocardiogram, taken upon admission to the hospital,
showed no change as a result of the accident. He
tolerated the surgery well, ate his evening meal at
the hospital, was found in good condition by his
physician when visited between 6:00 and 8:00 o'clock p.m. and also by his wife, who visited him
until 9 :30 p.m. He was sleeping soundly at 1 :00
19

a.m. when he was awakened by the nurse for the
purpose of checking his pulse, temperature and respiration, all of which were normal. Mr. DiEnes died
ten minutes later. These facts, together with the
opinions of the medical experts which were in conflict as to the cause of death, were in sharp focus.
There was then properly before the jury the very
question which the plaintiff contends was not presented to them for consideration, i.e., whether or not
Mr. DiEnes' death resulted from " . . . bodily injuries effected soley through external, violent and
accidental means . . . " The jury determined that
the death did not so result and there is ample evidence in the record to support that finding. This
court in Hales vs. Peterson, 11 U.2d 411, 360 P.2d
822, 824 ( 1961) stated:
"We have heretofore recognized the importance of safeguarding the right of trial by
jury. A necessary corollary to it is that there
must be some solidarity in the result so that
it can be relied upon. To the extent the verdict
can easily be set aside by the court, the ri~lit
to trial by jury is weakened. In order to give
substance to the right, once the trial has been
had and a verdict rendered it should not be
regarded lightly, nor overturned because of
errors or irregularities unless they are of sufficient consequence to have affected the result.
"Anyone acquainted with the practical
operation of a trial by jury and the human
factors that must play a part therein is aware
that it would be almost impossible to complete
a trial of any length without some things oc1
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curring with which counsel, after the case is
lost, can find fault and, in zeal for his cause
all quite in good faith, magnify into erro;
which to him and the losing parties seems
blamable for their failure to prevail. However,
from th~ st.andpoint of administering evenhanded Justice the court must dispassionately
survey such claims against the overall picture
of the trial, and if the parties have been afforded an opportunity to fully and fairly present their evidence and arguments upon the
issues, and the jury has made its determination thereon, the objective of the proceeding
has been accomplished. And the judgment
should not be disturbed unless it is shown that
there is error which is substantial and prejudicial in the sense that it appears that there
is a reasonable likelihood that the result
would have been different in the absence of
sueh error, . . . "
The verdict and judgment of the trial court is
entitled to a presumption of validity and should not
be overturned except for the reasons indicated. Brereton vs. Dixon, 20 U.2d 64, 433 P.2d 3 (1967).
It is submitted that the plaintiffs were given
a full opportunity to try their case and present that
evidence which they believed would sustain their
claims. The plaintiffs' theory of recovery was submitted to the jury in the language of the policy without embellishment or unnecessary comment. The
language of the policy was not ambiguous. The
terms used in the insuring statement were simple
and subject to common understanding. The jury de21

termined by a preponderance of the evidence that
death resulted from heart disease of a serious and
long standing nature and not as the result of the
"injuries effected solely through external, violent
and accidental means, . . . " Since there is ample
credibile testimony in the record upon which they
could make that finding, the judgment entered on
their verdict should be affirmed.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 16, 17, 18 AND
19.

The plaintiffs claim that their theory of the
case, as set forth in Instruction Numbers 16, 17, 18
and 19, was not presented to the jury.
Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No. 16:
"You are instructed that from the undisputed testimony in this case Mr. DiEnes did
in fact suffer an acute coronary insufficiency
on August 5, 1965, which was the immediate
cause of his death. You must determine by a
preponderance of the evidence whether the
acute coronary insufficiency was set in motion by accidental injuries sustained by Mr.
DiEnes, or whether the acute coronary insufficiency was controlled, directed or influenced
·in its action or behavior by accidental injuries sustained by Mr. DiEnes. If you find by
a preponderance of the evidence that the acute
coronary insufficiency was set in motion, controlled directed or influenced by accidental
injuri~s to Mr. DiEnes, then you may find
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that the coronary insufficiency and death
were a result of the accident, and not the independent cause of the death of Mr. DiEnes."
By the instruction, the jury is first advised that
the immediate cause of death was "an acute coronary insufficiency." The second sentence of the instruction advises the jury that their responsibility
is to determine between two alternatives: ( 1) Whether the coronary insufficiency was set in motion by
the accidental injuries sustained by DiEnes, or (2)
whether the coronary insufficiency was "controlled,
directed or influenced in its action or behavior by
accidental injuries sustained by DiEnes." A choice
between these two alternatives is the equivalent of
a directed verdict. The second alternative is but a
restatement of the first and is argumentative. More
obvious, however, is the omission from the requested
instruction of the primary question of whether the
'''acute coronary insufficiency" was the result of the
prior heart disease experienced by DiEnes over a
number of years. The whole instruction is in an
argumentative form emphasizing the plaintiffs'
view of the evidence.
The substance of this requested instruction was
properly given in Instruction No. 15, which accurately sets forth the insuring provisions of the policy
without unnecessary comment.
Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No. 17, is as
follows:
"Starting with a bo.dily inj.ury, all ~or
bid changes in the exercise of vital funct10ns
23

which result from or are induced by such injury should be regarded as the effect thereof
and not as independent causes. When death
results from any such morbid change so re~ulting from or induced.by such injury, the in~ur:y and not the morbid change induced by
it, is the cause of death. Beginning with a
primary cause, conditions induced by such
cause and effects thereof, and every condition
so induced must be considered in relation
thereto as an effect and not as a cause."
This instruction is a more obvious comment on
the evidence than No. 16. It is a direct attempt to
slant the testimony in favor of a plaintiffs' verdict.
The question for jury consideration was not whether
there had been a "morbid change, so resulting from
or induced by such injury", but whether or not DiEnes' death resulted from " ... bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental
means ... ", and this question was presented to the
jury.
Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No. 18, reads
as follows:
'''You are instructed that when an insurance company insures the life of an individual
with an accidental double indemnity policy,
that the insurance company takes that i~di
vidual 'as he is.' If an accident by operatmg
on that particular insured individual actually
set in motion causes which would not have
been set in motion in a normal person but
which, nevertheless, resulted in the de:~,th of
the insured, it is a reasonable construct10n ~f
the policy to hold that the death was the direct result of the accident."
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Again, this requested Instruction is not only
an unfair comment upon the evidence of the case,
it is an attempt to have the Court argue the plaintiffs' theory of the case under the quise of an instruction. His also duplicitous.
The folly of attempting to argue one's case in
the instructions rather than to confine them to a
statement of the issues of law, has been previously
condemned by this Court. Cornwell vs. Barton, 18
U.2d 325, 422 P.2d 663 (1967).
Plaintiffs' Requested Instruction No. 19, reads
as follows:
"You are instructed that under the terms
of the policy involved in this case, the deceased, Mr. DiEnes, must have:
"l. Sustained bodily injuries effected
solely through external, violent and accidental
means in order to recover, and

"2. As a result of such injuries, his
death must have occurred within ninety days.
"The death need not have resulted solely
from the injuries incurred by external, violent
and accidental means, but must have occurred
as a result of these injuries in order for plaintiffs to recover."
Here again, the plaintiffs have attempted to
rewrite the insuring language in terms favorable
to themselves. The substance of this instruction was
given in Instruction No. 15, as follows:
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"INSTRUCTION NO. 15
~'In order to prove the essential elements
of plaintiffs' claim, the burden is on them
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence in the case the following proposition:
That the death of Louis DiEnes was a result
of bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means."
As previously noted, the plaintiffs implied to
the court that if the jury were instructed in the
language of Instruction No. 15, that such would be
acceptable ( R. 100) .
It is submitted that each of the requested instructions were properly denied by the court. None,
nor all of them, were proper substitutes, for the plain
and simple language contained in the policy. Had
the requested instructions been given, they would
have overshadowed the real issue of the case, i.e.,
did the plaintiffs' decedent sustain " ... bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and
accidental means, ... " from which he died. That
precise question was presented to the jury for determination in the court's Instruction No. 15.
The plaintiffs contend that defendant's counsel
committed error in his summation to the jury by
reading the court's instruction No. 15 and stating
that the plaintiffs could not recover unless they
proved that the death of DiEnes resulted solely from
injuries effected through external, violent and accidental means. This was substantially the language
of the instruction, and it is difficult to see how such
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a statement could result in prejudice. Defendant's
counsel merely argued his view of the facts to which
the instruction was applicable. Plaintiffs' counsel
had the same privilege. In any event, this court has
stated that:
"If something occurs which the party
thinks is wrong and so prejudicial to him that
he thereafter cannot have a fair trial, he must
make his objection promptly and seek redress
by moving for a mistrial, or by having cautionary instructions given, if that be deemed
adequate, or be held to waive whatever rights
may have existed to do so." Hill vs. Cloward,
14 U.2d 55, 58, 377 P.2d 186 (1962).
Plaintiffs' counsel made no such request of the
Court (R. 140).
Further, the jury was admonished in Instruction No. 9 not to consider or be influenced by any
statement of counsel as to what the evidence is, unless stated correctly, or in any statement of counsel
of facts not shown in the evidence.
The plaintiff further argues that:
"There can be no dispute that Mr. DiEnes sustained 'bodily injuries effected solely
through external, violent and a c c i d e n t a 1
means'." (Plaintiffs' Brief p.26).
They allege prejudicial error because the court refused to so instruct the jury. If there was no question about those matters being factual, it would seem
to be as obvious to the jury as to the court, and no
prejudicial error could result from failing to emphasize that fact with the jury.
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The court denied defendant's Motion for a nonsuit and permitted the jury to consider the central
question of whether or not DiEnes' death resulted
from '''. . . bodily injuries effected solely through
external, violent and accidental means . . . ", the
very language of the policy. The jury unanimously
rejected plaintiffs' claim and found that the plaintiff died from conditions related solely to his previous heart condition.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff's theory of the case was properly
considered by the court and submitted to the jury,
not in the repetitious and argumentative form of
plaintiffs' requested instructions, but in the plain,
concise and simple language of the insuring provisions of the policy. Plaintiffs impliedly consented to
the form of Instruction No. 15, which presented the
heart of the case to the jury. The other requested
instructions were but comments to plaintiffs' view
of the evidence, and it would have constituted prejudicial error had they seen given. There is ample
evidence to sustain the jury's finding.
Plaintiffs' assertion that defendant's counsel
engaged in improper argument in his summation to
the jury ·is without merit, and even if such an error
were committed, plaintiffs' counsel did not preserve
his right to assert it in this court. Additionally, it
was not an irregularity of sufficient consequence
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to have affected the result". Hale vs. Peterson, 11
U. 2d 411, 360 P.2d 822-824 (1961).
The judgment entered on the jury verdict
should be affirmed.
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